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THE CONCEPT OF RETROACTIVITY: 
Its variations in the dif ferent branches of law. 
MARY ANNE BUHAGIAR 
THE concept of retroacti vity has a deceptively theoretical content. 
The most irresistible temptation is to treat it as merely designa­
ting a particular mode of operation of the legal norm, i.e. the pro­
cess whereby such norm can be made to apply to past situations, 
which are properly regulated by earlier norms dealing with the 
same subj ect�matter. This outlook, in its insistence on limiting a 
theory of retroacti vity to a study of the relation between static, 
consecutive norms within a legal system, with reference merely to 
a given juridical situation or fact, tends to ov�rlook the truth that 
the real core of the theory is NOT the legal system, but LAW 
ITSELF, viewed as a dynamic structure which is capable of de­
termining the course of social and economic progress within so­
ciety. The purely theoretical content is reflected in the analogy 
drawn by Savigny, according to which retro activity explores the 
juridical line of communication between two consecutive laws, 
just as private international law explores the points of intersec­
tion between contemporaneous legal systems. But, such an ap­
proach is irrsufficient: it still needs to be complemented by the 
sociological and personal 9ackground, which animates the con­
cept under analysis. Indeed(!he very raison d'etre of a theory of 
retroactivity is to ensure a smooth evolution of social progress, 
free from any 'juridical leaps' that could impair rights acquired 
under old laws, enacted by the proper state-organ or authority. 
This implies that the underlying principles of a general theory of 
retroactivity are: 
(i) Laws introducing brand-new institutions, as The Emer­
gency Labour Corps Act (1972), are excluded by the theory be­
cause they stand in no special relation to the past. 
(ii) Laws effecting substantial reforms in existing institutions
should, as far as possible, avoid impairing rights acquired under 
the old law. 
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(iii) Laws which abolish completely existing institutions or
rights should, as Gabba rightly maintains, operate only for the 
future, thus leaving intact the rights or institutions validly con­
stituted under the old law. This refutes the theory of retroactive 
operation of so-called prohibitive laws, proposed by Lasalle. 
The above 3 principles show that the theory of retroactivity 
natural.ly, and paradoxically at the same time, approves of the 
Latin maxim lex non habet oculas retro. Indeed, some writers, 
among them Clementine and de la Grassaye, have exalted this 
principle of non-retro activity of law to the status of a Grundnorm, 
which unifies all fields of law, whether private or public. Even 
some modern codes have found it convenient to insert an article 
providing for the non-retroactive operation of law in general. In 
Italy, for example, Section II of the Preliminary Title to the Civil 
Code provides: 
'La legge non dispone che per l'avvenire: essa non ha effetto 
retroatti vo.' 
Attempts have been made before the Italian Constitutional Court 
to attribute a constitutional significance to this provision. But, 
the said Court has repeatedly declared that no law can be declared 
invalid on the grounds that it contravenes Section II, for the prin­
ciple of non-retroactivity has received constitutional protection 
only in the criminal law field. Along these lines, the Italian Court 
of Appeal on the 7th May, 1966, argued as follows: 
'La irretroattivita delle leggi e costituzionalmente garantita 
con esclusivo riferimento alle norme penali e non anche al­
le norme civili, amministrattive e tributarie, rispetto alle quali, 
l 'irretroattivica. non e stabilita in modo vincolante, neanche 
dall'art.11 poiche questa disposizione, avendo valore di legge 
ordinaria, puo essere derogata da altra nolIIla di pari efficacia.' 
What, therefore, is the legal force of Section II? A number of Ital­
ian judgments in the 1960s concur in the view that the principle 
of non-retroactivity of laws, with the exception of criminal law, is 
merely 'un principio generale del (nostto) ordinamento giuridico'; 
and. therefore, 'il legislatore conserva piena facolta di de.rogarvi 
quando eccezionalmente lo ritenga opportuno. Accordingly Sec­
tion II prescribes merely a rule of construction, to be followed by 
the Court, when no transitory provision exist� in a repealing or 
amending Act. The same situation prevails in France, in virtue 
of the identical provi.sion contained in Section2 of the Preliminary 
Title to the Civil Code. 
tn Malta, the general provision relating to retroactivity is con-
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tained in section 12 of the Interpretation Act of 1975. It is more 
detailed than the sweeping article of the two said Codes, but its 
sphere of application is equally far-reaching and permeates into 
all fields of law. In sub-section (1), which deals with Repealing 
Acts passed after commencement oi the z9-5 Act, it enunciates, 
and unlike the French and Italian provision, even gives substance 
to the principle of non-retroacti vity, by making it binding upon 
Maltese Courts to apply the doctrine of vested rights, whenever 
no transitory provision exists in a legal instrument. Accordingly 
it provides that the said Acts shall not - unless the contrary in· 
tentioo appears: 
... (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so re­
pealed, or anything duly done or suffered under any law so 
repealed. 
(c ) affect any right, privilege, or liability acquired, or 
accrued, or incurred under any law so repealed. 
The same principle is made to apply to Am.endz'ng Acts, irrespec­
tive of the date when passed, by sub-section (2). The word 'Acts'
used in Sub-Sections prima facie limits its application to laws 
enacted by Parliament. This, however, is not the case, for section 
2 provides that 'Act' as used in the 1975 law itself includes any 
instrument having the force of law, excepting only such instru­
ments as may be subject to the provisions of the Interpretation 
Act 1889, passed by the U.K. Parliament, e.i. the 1964 Constitu­
tion. Accordingly, subject to this exception, the doctrine of ves­
ted rights must be applied by our Courts even when the repealing 
or amending instrument is some particular type of subsidiary le­
gislation. Another important feature of the Interpretation Act is 
that it distinguishes between a repealing and an amending Act 
from a purely theoretical angle, and not from the point of view of 
their effects. This is implied from the definition of 'amendment', 
given in. sub-section (3) of section 12, which includes also sub­
stitution and replacement. Bearing in mind that the latter two pro­
cesses can effect the prohibition of certain rights or institutions, 
it can be stated that abolition, as opposed to mere ref orm of ex­
isting rights. does not really characterize the notion of repeal 
under section 12 of the 1975 law. What really distinguishes repeal 
from amendment is the fact that the le gislator has decided to ef­
face a le gal norm without inserting a new one in its place. Such 
an approach is definitely recommendable because it provides a 
criterion which is absolute, and is, of its very legal nature, easily 
discernible. 
Having examined the approach adopted by our Interpretation 
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Act in the field of retro activity, it is worthwhile to examine whe­
ther section 12 does in fact succeed in achieving some constitu­
tive effect or in eliminating some of the vagueness surrounding 
the theories of retroactivity, previously relied upon by Maltese 
Courts, i.e. the theory of Gabba and Pacifici Mazzoni. Any idea 
that section 12 is binding on the legislator until he decides to 
repeal it is untenable. The phrase 'until the contrary intention 
appears' implies that the legislator is still free to insert a tran­
sitory provision which is in complete defiance of the doctrine of 
vested rights. The fact acknowledged by the Civil Court, in Az­
zopardi Zammit vs Fomzasa (1931) that 'la giurisprudenza ha 
sempre riconosciuto questa facolca nel legislatore di rendere re­
troatti va una legge indipendentemente del fatto che tale legge leder­
ebbe diritti quesiti' is still juridically valid. Moreover, the prin­
ciple that, in absence of an express provision prescribing retro­
activity, operation for the future is to be presumed, had been 
repeatedly asserted by our Courts. Accordingly, in Mizzi vs· Far-
rell (1945), the Court of Appeal annulled a Rent-Board's decision 
on the grounds that the said Board had applied retroactively a law 
regulating increase of rent. It explained that 'ma hemmx fl-Or­
dinanza 16 tal-1944 1-ebda dispozizzjoni Ii taghti lill-istess 
Ordinanza forza retroattiva; u ghalhekk hija ma tistax tigi appli­
kata hlief ghal zmien wara d-data tal-promulgazzjoni taghha.
, 
Indeed, neither does section . 12 resolve any problem concerning 
the application of the doctrine of non-retroacti vity, for the Courts 
will still find difficulty in determining the point at which a 'right, 
privilege or liability' has been 'acquired, accrued, or incurred' 
under the repealed law. Indeed, far from subverting the present 
state of law, section 12 may be said to constitute mere formulation 
of the judicial trend that has till now prevailed in Malta. 
The doctrine of vested rights, as expounded by Gabba, there­
fore, still retains its former juridical importance. As a starting 
point of his definition of a vested right or 'diritto acquisito ', he 
criticizes the definitions brought f�rward by other jurists in de­
termining which elements to include within his own definition. 
The elements he arrives at are the following: 
(i) Vested rights must have entered the 'pa.trimonio' (property)
of the subject. This idea he borrowed from Meyer, who defined 
them as 'diritti che diventarono proprieta di colui che li esercita, 
cosicche costui puo goderne e dispome nel modo piu assoluto.' 
Similarly Merlin had said that vested rights are 'quelli che sono 
entraci nel nostro dominio'. Savigny, too, maintained that such 
rights 'costituiscono un oggetto della signoria individuale'. All 
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these interchangeable terms mean to establish the truth that a 
vested right is one which, at the moment of its acquisition, enters 
within the patrimony of the acquiring subject. Accordingly, not all 
the rights possessed by an individual are vested rights, e.g. rights 
of capacity are not rights in the proper sense, because they lack 
the element of enforceability; there is no person against whom I 
can enforce my right of citizenship. If the State refuses to recog­
nize me as citizen in its law, I must remain without my legal 
remedy. 
(ii) Vested rights must necessarily be differentiated from the
so-calle d 'diritti consumati'. This idea Gabba took over from 
Reinhardt's and Spangenburg' s definitions, themselves improved 
upon by Savigny who said that a vested right 'e ogni diritto fon­
dato su di un fatto giuridico accaduto ma che non venne ancora
fatto valere.' A consummated right, therefore, is one which has 
not only gained access into the 'patrimonio' of the individual, but 
has actually become at one with it, thus making it impossible for 
any new law, even if made expressly retroactive by the legislator,
to be applicable in its regard. Gabba maintains that these rights 
can be either those sealed by an inappealable Court judgement or 
by compromise. 
(iii) Vested rights are not necessarily created voluntarily by the
individual; they may also accrue to the individual, by operation of 
the law. Bearing in mind these three elements, Gabba formulates 
the following definition: 'E acquisito ogni diritto che ( a) e con­
·sequenza di un fatto idoneo a produrlo, in virtu. della Legge del
tempo in cui il f atto venne compiuto, benche l'occasione di farlo
val ere non ·si.asi. presentata prim a dell' attuazione di una Legge
. nuova intomo al medesimo e che ( b) a termini della Legge sotto
l'impero della quale accade il fatto da cui trae origine, entro im­
mediatamente a far parte del patrimonio di chi lo ha acqui'stato.'
Accordingly, the acquisition of a vested right is marked by the
point of intersection between a juridical situation and the "law
which regulates it. 'La dottrina del diritto quesito,' says Gabba,
'e in sostanza il risultato di una sintesi dei principi concemanti
ciascuno dei suoi due elemenci componenti che sono: il diritto 
obiettivamente considerato, e il fatto acquisitivo che trasforma 
quello da obiettivo in subiettivo o individuale.' A legal norm, on 
its own, therefore, cannot be productive of a vested right. It is
only when the juridical situation contemplated by it comes into 
existence, that it acts upon the said norm and in accordance with 
it produces a vested right in the individuaL ... It is precisely this 
element of bilateralism that characterizes btiie' notion of a vested 
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right, and gives rise to the four requisites, which a juridical fact 
must satisfy before it can act through the legal norm to convert it 
into a concrete, vested, and individual right: 
( 1) The fact capable of grounding acquisition must have been
fully accomplished in terms of law. Thus, if the period of acquisi­
tive prescription is of 30 years, and on the date of commencement 
of a new law increasing the said period, it is still in its 28th 
year, it cannot be claimed that ownership has been acquired. On 
the other hand, if the 30 years have elapsed before the commence­
ment of the new Act, the new prescriptive period cannot apply, for 
the acquisitive fact has been fully accomplished. 
(2) The fact allegedly grounding the acquisition of a vested
right must be posterior to, or at least contemporaneous with, the 
law in virtue of which such right is generated. 
e) The parties must have the required legal capacity.
(4) And they must have observed all the formalities prescribed
by law. 
The first requisite, relating to the fai.t accompli gives rise to 
many legal difficulties. Accordingly, bearing in mind the truth 
that some juridical transactions can only be accomplished in sep­
arate stages, as a contract which requires a proposal and an ac­
ceptance, Gabba determines the three cases in which we can 
really say that such a transaction qualifies as a fai.t accompli, 
even though there is some fact which still needs to occur: 
(i) When it is certain that such fact will happen. E.g. I prom­
ise to give B £MIO on Monday. B acquires the right to enforce my 
promise before the day on which payment is due. 
(ii) When the fact is uncertain, but forms a suspensive condi­
tion of the transaction. E.g. I promise to lend B £M 1000 within 
2 years, if by then my business profits will have exceeded £M5000. 
If a new law on contracts is passed during the course of those 
two years, it cannot impair B's right to enforce my promise, when 
the condition comes true. 'I diritti condizionali, (whether contrac­
tual or testamentary), says Gabba, 'posci in essere vigendo una 
legge anteriore, non possono mai trovare ostacolo all'effettuazione 
loro nella legge nuova sotto il cui impero la condizione si avveri.' 
This principle has been expounded by our Courts, outside the 
context of transitory law, in Cilia vs Farrugia. In that case, the 
tenements occupied by plaintiff and defendant had a common well. 
Defendant, however, had promised plaintiff to block the well as 
soon as he would become owner. The Court, relying on the prin­
ciple that 'l-adempiment tal-kondizzjoni ghandu effett retroatciv 
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ghall-epoka meta jkun sar il-kuntratt,' held that once the plaintiff 
did become owner, he was bound to fulfil his obligation, in ac­
cordance with the terms agreed upon at the moment of conclusion 
of the con tract. 
(iii) When the missing fact constitutes a mere evolution of the
vested right in which it is rooted. E.g. the right of action. Out­
side these three hypotheses, the juridical transaction cannot be 
productive of a vested right; it is still a '/ atto acquisitivo incom­
pl eto', which gives rise to mere 'asp ettative' or expectations of 
true rights. E.g. the expectation of a person who is in the course 
of acquiring through prescription. 
An important feature of Gabba's doctrine is the three-graded 
hierarchy which envisages these categories of rights: (i) consum­
mated rights; (ii) vested rights and (iii) the so-called facolta di 
legge, which are mere pseudo-rights, incapable, by their own 
nature, of gaining access to the juridical notion of 'diritto ac­
quisito'. 
While dealing with the notion of facolta, Gabba points out that, 
having regard to the facultati ve element virtually characterizing 
all rights, it is only with great difficulty that a juridical distinc-
tion between 'facolta' and 'diritto acquisito' can be formulated. 
Indeed, there exists no substantial distinction between them; the 
only difference being that 'facolta'. mark the point of origin of 
vested rights: most vested rights have, at some point prior to their 
acquisition, subsisted in the form of a faculty conferred by law. 
'Le facolt3: non possono venir contrapposte ai veri e propri diritti, 
se non intendendole an teriori ai m edesimi . .. Codes ta anteriori ta 
ad ogni e qualsi voglia diritto e il solo criterio sicuro e assoluto 
onde contraddistinguere le facolta dai diritti quesiti. The facolta, 
therefore, always precedes the· vested right. It is only when the 
individual actually utilizes such faculty that he ipso factg con­
verts it into a vested right, and forestalls the operation of a new 
law in his regard. Until he ·does utilize it, however, any new law 
can take it away from him; and he has no grounds upon which to 
raise any complaint. E.g. If a new law is to the effect that per­
sons formerly capable of making a will are now rendered incap­
able, no one of them, who has not made a will under the old law, 
can claim the capacity taken away from him; on the other hand, 
wills validly made under the old law remain valid. 
Another distinguishing feature of a 'facolta' is that, in vinue of 
equity, the mere commencement of its execution suffices to effect 
the conversion into a vested right. This principle, however, must 
be applied with moderation, having regard always to the acuteness 
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of the individual benefit derived from the alleged vested right. 
E.g. A new law which abolishes divorce should not be allowed to
affect pending divorce proceedings.
A third feature relates to the process whereby the attribute of 
'facolta' is denied to all those faculties arising out of true vested 
rights, e.g. the faculties which accrue to the parties in virtue of a 
contract between them. In such cases, the faculties are deemed to 
be juridically unified with the vested right from which they flow, 
i.e. they are true vested rights.
The application of the distinction between a faculty and a
vested right is occasionally subject to juridical controversy. Toe 
right of action, for example, has been treated by writers like 
Weber as a mere faculty which can be taken away retroactively by 
a new law, provided it has not been exercised� Gabba, however, 
rightly enough, recognizes the dependance of a vested right upon 
the action which protects it, and maintains that actions which 
protect vested rights are themselves, in virtue of that fact, vested 
rights which cannot be removed by a new law. Accordingly, if I 
have a right of action under a particular law, I can utilize such 
right even after its abroga�n, provided the causes of action 
arose before such abrogation� This was the line followed by 
English Courts in the Smithies and National ·Association of Opera­
tive Plasterers case (1909), where they declared that section 4 of 
the Trade Disputes Act, which granted immunity to specified trade 
unions, was not retrospective. Therefore, since the causes of 
action against the Association, itself a registered trade union, 
had arisen before the c;ommencement of the said Act, the action 
had to be maintained.Jt is also the line followed by section 12 of 
the 1975 Interpretation Act, which provides that a repealing Act 
shall not affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in 
respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, 
forfeiture or punishment as has been acquired, accrued, or in­
curred under the repealed law. Moreover, 'any such investigation, 
legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or en­
forced.' This shows that under our law a right of action is a ves­
ted right, and is enforceable even after the abrogation of the law 
which grants it .. The doubt which arises is whether our Courts will 
apply the above provision to ALL actions, or as Gabba maintains, 
only to actions which protect vested rights and not mere faculties. 
The answer lies in the interpretation which the Courts will give 
to the words (12(1Xc)) 'any right privilege or liability acquired, 
accrued, or incurred under the repealed law'. If they will accept 
Gabba' s doctrine that, say, rights of capacity, rights regulating 
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status, and perpetual rights are mere faculties, not falling under 
sub-paragraph (c), they will also have to accept that actions pro­
tecting such rights, as actions for disavowal, are also faculties 
and the principle of non-rettoacti vity does not apply in their re­
gard. A second doubt arises, in the case of amending Acts, in 
respect of which, there exists no provision similar to sub-para­
graph (c) of sub-section (1), relating to legal proceedings. Does 
the absence of such a provision mean to imply that when a right of 
action is lost in virtue of an amending act, it is not enforceable, 
after the commencement of the said Act, even in respect of causes 
of action arising before commencement? The issue will eventually 
depend on Court interpretation. 
It is now possible to apply the doctrine of vested rights to 
civil relations. The law of persons will serve as an appropriate 
and intriguing starting-point. Most of the legal nonns in this field 
of law are concerned with the regulation of personal status, whe­
ther viewed from the point of view of the family, as legitimacy, 
illegitimac y ,  paternity, adoption, or from the point of view of 
society, as citizenship, tutorship, ·curatorship. Gabba maintains 
that all such 'rights' fall under the category of 'facolta', and once 
the legislator takes them away or refonns them, no person who has 
not made use of them under the old law can claim the m  back. 
E.g. If a new law provides that nationals of State X cannot be­
come citizens of Malta, none of the said nationals who has not
acquired citizenship under the old law can allege violation of a
vested right. This example shows that the raison d'etre of the
principle of retroactivity of laws regulating status is that status
is creative of durable effects, in respect of which the State re­
serve its right to legislate. To expect that State legislation on
citizenship or marriage will apply only to persons who have not
yet acquired citizenship or entered into matrimony would be to
discard all considerations of smooth evolution of social progress.
Even the individual cannot legitimately expect that his citizenship
and matrimonial rights will remain unaltered. Indeed, all rights ac­
cruing froII! status are of their own nature elementaty, or to use
Gabba' s term - 'fondam·entali' - because th ey represent the sine
qua non conditions which must be ful filled before all other rights
can be acquired. And ' queste condizioni o premesse fondamentali
dei veri diritti', says the same author, ' sono date dalla civile con­
venienza e dalla legge che la govema, e per natura loro, devono
restare in potere della socieca e della legge senza mai diventare
diritci quesiti, inviolabili dell' individuo.' This, however, does not
mean that there exist no vested rights in the field of personal
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status: the basic principle which is in force declares that once a 
status which is favourable to the individual has been acquired, 
e.g. legitimacy, it cannot be lost, in virtue of a new law. This
principle applies also to the status of husband and wife created
through the contract of marriage; to citizenship acquired by rea­
son of place of binh, through registrati on, or automatically in the
circumstances required by law; and to the status of a legitimated,
adopted or acknowledged child or of a legally separated spouse.
In so far as each of the above conditions are favourable to the 
individual they cannot be terminated by a new law. Acqui·sition of 
status must be exclusively governed by the law which is in force 
when the acquisition is perfected. This can be translated in the 
following three rules: 
(i) A law introducing new grounds of lo-ss of status should
never be construed retrospectively. But if the cause of the new 
grounds is of a permanent nature, it gets caught by the new law, 
under which it continues to subsist. Therefore, if a law enacts 
that all nationals of State X must lose their citizenship, it should 
receive immediate application, and the said nationals lose their 
citizenship. 
(ii) The formaUties of the juridical. act constituting the acqui­
·sition of a new status must be regulat.ed by the law in force at. the
time of acquisition. A law dealing with the formalities for mar­
riage can never apply to marriages celebrated before its com­
mencement.
(iii) The val.idity or inval.idity of the acquisition of'status must
be judged in terms of the law in force at the moment of the acqui­
·sition. Accordingly, the validity of a marriage ought always to be
regulated by the law in force at the time of its celebration. A
marriage should no� become null, as a result of the commencement
of a new law, nor should a marriage, invalid when celebrated, be­
come automatically valid in virtue of a new law which takes away
cenain grounds of nullity allowed under the old law. This prin­
ciple has unfortunately been drastically violated by the Maltese
Marriage Act of 1975, which applies the section relating to nullity
to all marriages whether contracted before or after the commence­
ment of the Marriage Act, including marriages in respect of which
nullity proceedings were still pending, on the date of commence­
ment, before the Ecclesiastical Coutts. Only a judgment having
effect as res judicata on or before July 15th, 1975, continued to
be operative. Under our law, therefore, the action for annulment of
marriage is deemed to be a mere faculty, that can be taken away
by a new law. It does not even make Gabba' s equitable conces-
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sion, regarding the commencement of execution of the 'facolta' 
because the 1975 law is made to affect also pending proceedings. 
An additional problem is created by the prescription periods bar­
ring the action. Thus, in the case of infirmity of mind, if annul­
ment proceedings are not instituted within one year after the ces­
sation of the mental disease, the action is barred. Under canon 
law, infirmity of mind was held to imply absence of consent, i.e.
an absolute nullity, in respect of which a Court declaration could 
be sought by the parties, unhindered by any prescription periods. 
Thus a marriage invalid under the canon law provisions of in-
sanity could automatically become valid under section 20(b), if 
the one year cohabitation had already elapsed before the com­
mencement of the 1975 law. Indeed, this is only one of the ex­
amples showing how retroactivity can result in the automatic 
validation of a marriage that was null under the law in force at the 
time of its celebration. As a result of revolutionizing the concept 
of nullity, the 1975 law impairs the vested rights of those who 
could annull under canon law but are no longer able to do so. On 
the other hand, it also negates the rights of that person who val­
idly contracted marriage under canon law, and now finds that it is 
open to attack by the other spouse, e.g. on the ground of sterility, 
formerly unknown but now available to the non-sterile party. This 
state of law, which has Lasalle's approval in his theory of 'con­
valescenza', is opposed to that enunciated by Gabba, viz. 1La 
legge nuova, come non puo togliere effetto ai rapporti giuridici 
validamente conchiusi sotto l'impero di una legge precedente 
cosi non puo neppure attribuirlo ai rapporti giuridici invalidi in 
vim) della legge sotto cui vennero conchiusi.' This principle has 
also been curiously modified by the transitory provision of the 
1973 Civil Code (Amendment) Act, which guaranteed that it would 
not by itself validate any act which was null at the time it was 
done, but at the same time barred for the future the action for an­
nulment in respect of any such act. 
Annulment must not be confused with dissolubility. A law abol­
ishing divorce is made to apply even to marriages celebrated 
before its commencement; those persons who had not obtained a 
divorce under the old law cannot allege violation of their vested 
rights. Such an approach has not been accepted in English law. 
In the case Blyth vs Blyth ( 1966) - a case where plaintiff sought 
a d
i
vorce on the basis of the wife's adultery, decided by the 
House of Lords, it was implied that if the secti0n being dealt with 
had been of a substantive nature, no retroactive effect could be 
given to it. Having regard to the fact that our Coutts have gener-
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ally followed continental law, however, it is difficult to believe 
how they can ever accept the English legal standpoint. 
The law of persons involves the consideration of certain juridi­
cal conditions of persons, apparently capable of being treated 
under personal status. These are paternal authority, emancipation, 
tutorship, curatorship, and capacity of the married woman. Such 
conditions, however, are by no means creative of vested rights; 
they represent merely the machinery, exclusively contrived by the 
law, in view of ensuring the smoothest running of family life in 
accordance with the principles of child education and custody 
accepted in the community. They are just legal institutes that 
determine the juridical aspects of family life. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that cessation of any of the above conditions can occur 
in virtue of a new law, which thus legitimately receives imme­
diate application. This was the line taken by the 1973 (Amend­
ment) Act, in terms of which minors could become automatically 
subject to paternal authority and the 'status' of tutor, immediately 
lost and substituted by that of paternal authority. For the sake 
of continuity, it further provided that, if the tutri x was the mother, 
there was no obligation of rendering an account of her adrnini_stra­
tion. 
When we speak of the retroactivity of laws regulating status, 
therefore, we are including only those which deal with such status 
as is not capable of becoming a vested right of the individual. 
This substantial distinction between different kinds of status is 
made only in respect of laws regulating their acquisition or loss. 
In so far as their EFFECTS are concerned, no such distinction is
made. This gives rise to the rule that a new law regulating the 
effects of status, irrespective of whether the latter constitutes a 
vested right or not, must receive immediate application. Accor­
dingly, Pacifici Mazzoni says, 'Come gli effetti della filiazione 
legittima cos{ quelli della filiazione naturale, riconosciuta e 
dichiarata, vengono immediatam ente regolati dall a nuova legge.' 
Civil effects of marriage, effects of legal separation, adoption, 
legitimation, acknowledgement and even citizenship are regulated 
by the new law, even though their acquisition constitutes a vested 
right in the acquiring subject. 
Another rule postulating retroacti vity applies to 1 aws governing 
capacity, itself defined as 'those preliminary conditions to be 
satisfied by the individual before a juridical act can be validly 
performed'. Gabba treats capacity as signifying merely a modality 
of the right of citizenship, i.e. as implying the ways in which the 
individual can manifest his citizenship rights in the different 
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fields of law. Pacifici Mazzoni agrees with this view and says, 
'La capacita invera e una facolta che la legge riconosce e attri­
bui see ai cittadini ... questi sono dunque di null a pri vati dalla 
legge che loro toglie o restringe la capacita di cui, al suo attuarsi, 
godevano merce la legge anteriore.' Accordingly, laws governing 
the capacity to contract, to transfer real rights, or to acquire a 
particular status al ways receive immediate application. This, how­
ever, operates in such a way that vested rights actually acquired 
in tenns of the rules of capacity prescribed by the old law remain 
unimpaired. Therefore, if a new law introduces the civil incapacity 
of the married woman, no such woman can claim that a vested 
right has been taken away from her; but she can claim that all the 
juridical acts performed by her under the old law retain their val­
idity. Similarly, a law which determines what rights can be ac­
quired in respect of things, according to their juridical status 
(e.g. what things can be privately owned) must receive immediate 
application, without impairing rights validly acquired under the 
old law. 
Laws regulating the capacity to make wills, or to acquire an 
inheritance, present a more complex problem. The fact that they 
confer only 'facultative rights' is undoubted: a person who was 
capable of making a will can become incapable in virtue of a new 
law. What is less clear is what law will apply when a will has 
actually been made and when the law in force at the moment when 
the testator made his will i's eventually altered before his death. 
The generally accepted view is that a will is juridically perfected 
only at the time of the testator's death, a principle which has 
induced legal writers as Lasalle to conclude that the juridical 
capacity to make a will is regulated exclusively by the law in 
force when the said death occurs. Gabba rejects this view be­
cause it contemplates the possibility of validating a will which 
was null when made. To prevent this automatic healing of a le­
gally null act, therefore, he establishes the principle, also ac­
cepted by Pacifici Mazzoni, that the testator must be juridically 
capable both at the moment when he makes the will and at the 
time of his death. 
An application of the doctrine of vested rights to the law of 
succession centres around the rule that a will cannot be creative 
of vested rights before the decuius' death. Accordingly, we find 
that, in transitory law, devolution of inheritances is mainly reg­
ulated by the law in force when ·such death occurs. This espec­
ially refers to: 
(i) Laws which limit a person's liberty of disposing his pro-
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petty by will, e.g. a law which increases the right of legitim. 
(ii) Laws prescribing or prohibiting the juridical modes of ef­
fecting transfers causa mortis: e.g. a law which prohibits the in­
stitution of an herede fiduciarius. 
(iii) Laws regulating devolution of inheritance, i n  intestate
successions, taken as including the right of representation, and 
the apportionment of the deceased's estate. 
On the other hand, the law in force at time when the will is 
made regulates only such testamentary matters as are directly 
dependent upon the ·state of fact prevailing at the moment when 
the testator made his will, namely: 
(i) the form of the will, which is completely unrelated to the
juridical possibility of revocation; 
(ii) physical capacity, which is essentially geared to the tes­
tator's state of body or mind. 
The law of obligations presents a fairly unified ground in its 
confrontation with transitory law. 'II principio che regge tutta 
questa materia,' says Pacifici Mazzoni, 'e che le obbligazioni 
sono regolate dalla legge vigente al tempo in cui nacquero.' The 
same principle is enunciated by Gabba and has been repeatedly 
applied by our Courts. In Borg vs Borg (1907) it was decided that 
'Fil-materj a tal-kuntratti, il-ligi applikabbli hij a dik ta' meta saret 
1-obbligazzjoni u meta sehh il-kuntratt; u mhux dik ta' meta ghan· 
dha tigi deciza xi kontroversj a relativa, j ekk fl-interval! il-ligi 
tkun tbiddlet, ghaliex •• . huwa prezumibbli illi .•• forsi 1-parti­
jiet, kieku kienu jafu li 1-ligi mhijiex il-qadima, ma kenux jaghmlu 
dak il-kuntratt.' The principle virtually encompasses the entire 
field of obligations within its sphere of operation. Accordingly, 
the law in force at the time of formation of the obligation reg­
ulates: 
(i) The validity or invalidity of the obligation, including cap­
acity of the parties and vitiation of their consent on the grounds 
of error, violence or fraud. 
(ii) The juridical aptness of the object of the obligation and
the cause of such obligation. 
(iii) The juridical character of the obligation, e.g. whether it is
in solidum or not, or whether it is civil or natural. 
(iv) The effects of the obligation, even if peculiar to a special
type of obligation, e.g. the effects of sale. 
(v) The effects of ob�igation, vis-a-vis third parties, though
subject to some minor exceptions. 
(vi) Extinction or dissolution of the obligation, including dis-
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solution of the community of' acquests. This principle has been 
violated by the 1975 Civil Code (Amendment) Act, which retro­
actively abolished the juridical possibility of rescinding a sale or 
a partition on the grounds of lesion. 
The law of property, viewed in the light of transitory law, gives 
rise to a great deal of complexities. The reason for this is that 
its underlying principle is reflected in the legislator's faculty of 
regulating the juridical condition of things, of introducing new 
real rights or abolishing already existing ones, and of modifying 
their effects. This has induced Gabba to affirm that laws regula­
ting status include also those which govern the juridical condition 
of things. Status, therefore, can be personal or real; and, in both 
cases, it i s  productive of the same consequences in transitory 
law. This explains why a law which prescribes new distances to 
be observed in the construction of buildings must receive imme­
diate application. No person who has not constructed buildings 
under the old law can allege the violation of this 'vested right' to 
build at a closer distance. Accordingly, real rights just like 
'rights' regulating personal status are only mediately productive 
of vested rights: in other words their conversion into vested rights 
requires their actual exercise by the .acquiring subject. This posi­
tion radically differs from that prevailing under the law of obliga­
tions, the reason being, as Pacifici Mazzoni puts it, 'che i singoli 
effetti del diritto reale non si possono, come quelli delle obbli­
gazioni, considerarsi propri amente svolgimenti o trasformazioni 
del diritto quesito; perch e e in piena balia del legi slatore il 
prestabilire i modi e i limiti nei quali i cittadini possono disporre 
ed usare di ... cose materiali, e quindi nessun cittadino puo ac­
campare di fronte al legislatore in diritto quesito e un dato uso di 
quelle cose.' Society's interest in the regulation of real rights is 
juridically reflected in the fact that such rights are enforceable, 
not against detenninate individuals, but again st everybody. 
A special feature of real rights which does not arise in the 
case of personal status, however, results from the possibility 
that certain effects of real rights can be guaranteed by the con­
stitutive contract, as, for instance, emphyteusis, pledge, and 
conventional hypothec, which are, by their own nature, contrac­
tual. It is only too natural that those effects of real rights which 
are guaranteed in the contract cannot be modified by the new law. 
The extent to which this principle has been rejected by the 1976 
amendments on emphyteusis will be dealt with later. 
The two features of real rights so far dealt with account for the 
rule enunciated by Gabba whereby 'gli ef fetti dei diritti real.i pos-
15 
sono bens'i venire tolti o immutati da una l egge nuova con retro­
attivo o immediato ef fetto, finche non siano esercitati o dedotti in 
una convenzione, ma diventano veri e propri diritti quesiti intan­
gibili in virtu di quei fatti.' Here, therefore, we see how in the 
law of property the general principle, that a vested right com­
prises also its effects, is modified in so far as the vested real 
right comprises only such effects as have in fact been put into 
execution or drawn up in the constitutive agreement .. 
By way of a precautionary measure, Gabba rightly indicates the 
danger of confusing 'i veri e propri effetti del diritto reale' and 
'quelli che piuttosto sono effetti del titolo su cui il diritto mede­
simo in ogni singolo caso riposa'. This implies that whereas the 
truly real effects are liable to be immediately regulated by the 
new law, those effects which necessarily result from TITLE are, 
of their own nature, acquired at the moment when the real right i's 
constituted. Gabba, for example, holds that the right of the cred­
itor to retain the pledged res in special circumstances is one 
such effect, which, if pennissible under the law in force when the 
constitutive contract came into being, should not fall subject 
to the provisions of a new law abolishing such right. The 1975 
amendments, effected to th,e institute of p ledge, w ere applied 
retroactively by our legislator; but, having regard to their trend of 
conferring new rights, it may be said that they could not have im­
paired any vested rights. As to hypothecs, the same author points 
out that the right of priority of a hypothecated debt, the extension 
of such debt, and the detennination of the object of the hypothec, 
must be regulated by the law in force when the hypothec is con­
stituted. In emphyteusi s, the theoretical position is that the rela­
tions between �he direct owner and the emphyteuta are regulated 
by the law in force at the moment of conclusion of the constitu­
tive contract. In practice, however, the trend of modem legislators 
to facilitate the free transfer of immovable property has induced 
them to extend, in the public interest, the real as opposed to the 
contractual element in emphyteusis, with the result of enacting 
that ANY effects, subjected to amendment, are to be regulated by 
the new law. This is more or less the line taken by the 1976 amend­
ments, which, besides reducing the contractual l iberty o f  the 
parties, are made to apply to all emphyteuses constituted before 
January 1976, except those terminated before that date, or those 
determined or dissolved by agreement, by operation of the law, or 
by a judgment that had become res judicata. _Indeed, this provision 
runs counter to the principle that a contract is regulated by the 
law in force at the moment of its conclusion, for it has the effect 
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of nullifying clauses in emphyteutical contracts made before the 
said date and which are still in existence, insofar as they are in 
violation of the Amending Act. 
If it is a generally accepted principle that the effects which 
necessarily flow from title should not fall subject to a new law, it 
logically follows that the title itself, grounding the acquisition of 
the real right, is, as in the case of any other right, regulated by 
the law in force when the acquisition is perfected. This, in tum, 
gives rise to the following rules: 
(i) Laws which determine the juridical status of things in
relation to the real rights, of which they can form the object, 
should receive immediate application without impairing rights 
acquired in virtue of the old status. Therefore a law prescribing 
that only immovables can form the object of the right of usufruct 
cannot nullify rights of enjoyment over movables validly acquired 
under the old law. 
(ii) Validity of the acquisition, and the formalities necessary
to give it effect vis-a-vis third parties are regulated by the law in 
force at the moment of perfection of the acquisition. 
(iii) A law introducing new modes of extinction of real rights
should not apply to those rights constituted before its commerx:e­
ment. This principle has been, to an extent, violated by the 1975 
(Amendment) Act, which provides that general hypothecs are ex­
tinguished if the property to which they attach passes into the 
hands of a third part, and that general hypothecs constituted under 
the old law will not remain valid after the expiration of 10 years 
after the commencement of the said Act. 
Perpetual real rights are subject to the above principles only to 
the extent that the changes effected to them are not essentially 
related to their perpetual character. In so far as laws directly af­
fecting their perpetual nature is concerned, however, they fall 
under a regime of their own. They are at the complete mercy of the 
legislator, who is entitled· to modify or even abrogate perpetual 
institutions as he deems appropriate in the public interest. In­
deed, to say otherwise would mean that once such an institution 
is created by law, it must continue to exist forever; and eventually 
that would constantly and surely hinder the course of social pro­
gress. Gabba suggests that the complete abolition of a perpetual 
right, e.g. entail, should give rise to the State's obligation of 
granting compensation, just as in the case of expropriation. 
It is now necessary to see whether the doctrir;e of vested rights 
can gain access into those branches of law which imply a direct 
confrontation between the individual and State authority, viz. an 
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administration law, fiscal law and emergency law. Most of the 
laws enacted in these spheres are characterized by their tendency 
to impose restrictions on the individual, while increasing the dose 
of State control. In administrative law, for example, the process of 
delegation by Parliament of administrative powers, viewed against 
the complications of State machinery and the increasing exigen­
cies of the modem welfare State, necessarily implies an irresis­
tible growth of State authority. Similarly the raison d'etre of fiscal 
laws, e.g. laws of income taxation, is the principle of social jus­
tice which demands that the individual must actively contribute to 
the public good, each according to his financial capacity. Finally, 
emergency laws, by definition, tend to impose extraordinary res­
trictions upon individual action, their justification being that they 
are enacted in circumstances that inevitably warrant an enormous 
increase of State power, such as in wartime. This common char· 
acteristic of the laws under discussion shows the paramount im­
portance of the doctrine of vested rights in those areas of law 
where the individual is in most manifest jeopardy. Here, the retro­
active application of the new law generally implies a deterioration 
of individual liberty, and, therefore, the impingement upon a true 
vested right. Gabba' s assertion that 'il rispetto dei diritti acqui­
siti si fonda in sostanza sul rispetto dell'individuo' is especially 
true in those fields, where the State and the individual continually 
face each other in a common arena. 
Writers like Clementine and de la Grassaye believe that retro­
activity is a unitary concept which receives application in ALL 
fields of law. Italian Courts have accepted this view when they 
affirmed that the principle of non-retroactivity enunciated in the 
Preliminary Title to the Civil Code is applicable also to 'norme 
amministrative e tributarie'. In Malta, the doctrine of vested rights 
has been explicitly declared to be applicable to fiscal and emer­
gency law. In as early as 1902, in Gasan vs Zammit - where the 
Court was requested to determine the amount payable by plaintiff 
in stamp-duty - it was held that 'in materia di tassa ed imposta e 
principio di giustransitorio che tanto per determinare chi sia 
responsabile della tassa quanto per determinare !'impasto di 
questa, vuolsi avere riguardo all a Legge vigente nel giomo in cui 
son posti in essere gli atti ed affari colpiti dalla tassa.' The 
same principle was accepted in Cassar Torreggiani vs Gatt. �n 
this case, the Court had to decide whether a new law which in­
creased from one to ten years the pre-death period within which 
any donations effected could become subject to the payment of 
death duty was applicable retrospectively. It was held that al-
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though the 1948 law was of a fiscal nature, it could not be applied 
retroactively because it would impair the plaintiff's vested right 
to pay death duty only in respect of donations made not earlier 
than one year period allowed under the old law. Parallel to these 
two decisions, there is an Italian judgment delivered by the Court 
of Appeal on the 7th December 1967, which established that: 1 Il 
principio che la legge non dispone che per l' avvenire ... salvo 
specifica volonta contraria del legislatore sancito dall' articolo II 
... vale anche nel cam po del diritto tributario.' Indeed, the legis­
lator's option to impair the doctrine of vested rights subsists all 
the more in fiscal matters. Testa vs Bri.ffa, for example, confinns 
that ce pacifico in dottrina e nella giurisprudenza che anche a 
leggi di Finanza si e trovato talvolta convenience nello interesse 
dello Stato di dare effetto retroattivo.' From the point of view of 
transitory law, therefore, it can be safely concluded that, in Malta, 
a new fiscal law does not receive immediate application, irrespec­
tive of whether it impairs vested rights or not. The interest of the 
State, in fiscal legislation, is reflected in a rule of construction 
quite unrelated to retroacti vity, which was enunciated in Anastasi 
vs Camilleri (1%4): 1Il-ligijiet tributarji ghandhom jinterpretaw 
ruhhom skond 1-ispirtu u 1-ittra tal-ligi ... u fid-dubju ghandhom 
pjuttost jigu rizoluti affermativament,'l ghaliex il-kawza tad-dazju 
j ew imposta, xi tkun, hij a ta' utilita pubblika.' 
Emergency laws, known in Italian law as cleggi eccezionali', 
have also been dealt with by the Maltese Courts. In Butler vs 
Skipwkith, the Court of Appeal, reversing the judgment of the 
lower court, held that since the defendant did not specifically 
request the Court to determine the retro activity or otherwise of the 
1942 Regulations, it could not deal with it of its own initiative, 
because this would impair the procedural principle that the Court 
must base its decision upon such legal points as are specifically 
raised by the parties in the writ of summons. This approach im­
plies that the principle of innate retroactivity of emergency laws 
does not exist under our law. Indeed, if such principle were ap­
plied, the Court of Appeal would have inferred retroactivity from 
the very nature of the regulations, thus preventing it self from 
having recourse to the procedural principle referred to. 
In the sphere of administrative la�, as it operates in normal 
citizen life, the doctrine of vested rights is on less stable ground. 
This is so because of the infinite variety of laws that can be 
enacted in this field. Their subject-matter can range from educa· 
tion and wage-regulation to imports, requisition, country planning, 
etc. The logical outcome is th at non-retro activity is not bound to 
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be absolute: its relativity to the particular sector of public order 
that is being dealt with in the individual case cannot but have a 
bearing upon the end result. To say that the doctrine of vested 
rights is of no relevance in its application to the so-called sub­
sidiary laws made by administrative bodies would definitely run 
counter to justice. Of course, the fact that this latter theory has 
been discounted in emergency matters seems to suggest the ap­
proach of discounting it in all other areas of public administra­
tion. A case which explicitly confirms this idea is B aid acchino vs 
Caruana Demajo, where the Court decided that 'meta ma hemmx 
klawsola retroattiva, u meta l-kliem tal-ligi ma jkunux jimportaw 
retroattivita, ma ghandux ikun hemm effett retroattiv, lanqas jekk 
tkun materja ta' nteress jew ordni pubbliku.' The issue involved 
in that case was whether a Legal Notice prohibiting the importa­
tion of Russian films could receive retroactive application. Rely-
ing on the principle quoted, and on the English law position, 
whereby all laws, except those of a procedural nature, should 
apply for the future, the Court decided that the Legal Notice did
not apply to the plaintiffs; and this because it came into force 
after the importation of the said films had been perfected. 
Defying the absoluteness with which the Caro ana Demajo case 
established the application of the doctrine of vested right in all 
sectors of administrative law, however, Fenech vs Zarb acknowl­
edged, in its turn, the inevitability of recognizing the natural 
retro act ivity of laws, which are so intimately connected with 
public order that they transcend all possibility of judicial affinna­
tion of the existence of vested rights. In this case, the question 
arose whether the amendments effected to the University Statute 
could be applied retrospectively to students who had already 
started their course before the amendments were passed. The 
Court said that 'biex l-emendi ma jkunux retroattivi ... hemm 
bzonn li jsibu O'stakolu fid-dritt kwezit ta' l-istudenti, u li ma 
jkunx il-kaz td ligi li tinteressa l-ordni pubbliku. '. Moreover they 
failed to satisfy this test, on both counts. Registration for a par­
ticular course did not create any contractual relationship between 
the University and the students, and as regards the argument of 
public order, it was held that 'il-materja ta' 1-istruzzjonihij a ta' 
nteress pubbliku u hekk ukoll huma 1-ligijiet li jikkontrollaw dik 
il-materja, u ghalhekk ebda dritt ma jista' jigi akkampat kontra 
emendi li jmissu r-regolamenci tat-taghlim u 1-istruzzjoni.' After 
quoting Pacifici Mazzoni, who points out that laws relating to 
public order are retroactive, it upheld Gabba' s argument which 
envisages how the individual may find him self bound to submit to 
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the 'scopi o funzioni di pubblico interesse' with the result that he 
cannot acquire any vested rights, and that he must subject him self 
to any new law which alters the e.xi sting elements of public order. 
There are certain sectors of human life which have assumed the 
status of proper State functions, e.g. education, and public health. 
Any laws which regulate such sectors are in the nature of what 
Gabba calls 'concessioni politiche', which are revocable by the 
legislator at his will. What distinguishes these concessions from 
those 'nelle quali lo Stato apparisce datore nello stesso modo in 
cui · lo potrebbe essere un privato' - a distinction which echoes 
the old tragic concept of jure imperii - jure gestionis - is not 
capable of being subjected to any a priori test. The view that our 
Courts have accorded retroactivity to a law which pertai.ns ex­
clusively to public order seems to break down under the basic un­
certainty of its application. Yet it does have the merit of estab­
lishing the truth that our Courts employ a great deal of caution 
before deciding to exclude the doctrine of vested rights from the 
administrative law field. Torrente's assertion that laws of public 
order are retroactive only if so intended by the legislator is not 
valid because in the Caruana Demajo case, it was obvious that 
the legislator did intend retroacti vity, which, however, was not 
granted by the Court. The only safe conclusion to arrive at is that 
under our law, laws relating to public order are not essentially 
retroactive. The course of their operation is determined by the 
Courts after conducting an objective· analysis of the degree of in­
timacy between them and the ·sector of public order in which they 
are allegedly rooted This precarious condition, though in itself 
undesirable, is the logical outcome of the immense role of public 
order in modern States. 
The power to make retroactive subsidiary legislation is dealt 
with by the 197 5 Interpretation Act, in Section 9, which provides 
that such power is deemed to be implied, in all parent Acts, ir­
respective of whether passed before or after commencement. Sec­
tion 9, however, is applicable only to subsidiary legislation made 
after commencement. Accordingly, any subsidiary laws made 
before 197 5 are still regulated by the principle upheld in Bcddac­
chino vs Caruana Demajo and Bernard vs Attard, whereby a spe ­
cific provision in the parent Act is necessary to give rise to the 
power of making retroactive laws under the said Act. 
In connection with the theory of public order in transitory law, 
it is appropriate to indicate the peculiar status attributed to pro­
cedural laws and police laws by Maltese Courts. As regards police 
laws, the principle applicable is that enunciated in Police vs 
21 
Fal.zon, which states that coon vi puo essere diritto quesito in 
virtu di leggi anteriori ad escludere l' applicazione di leggi nuove.' 
Accordingly, police Jaws are intrinsically retroactive; the new law 
al ways receives immediate application, and the citizen is at all 
times expected to abide by it. Incidentally, the said principle 
refers only to police laws of a non-penal character, the pen al ones 
being themselves juridically assimilated to ordinary criminal law 
norms. 
Procedural laws tend-- to create a great deal of complexities in 
transitory law, and, ·as such, they must be viewed in the light of 
the various attitudes that can and have, in fact, been adopted 
towards them by different States. The general view is that once a 
law is classifie.d as procedural, it must of its own nature have 
a retrospective effect. This is the-situation under English law, 
which result s from the erroneous attitude of treating procedural law 
on a purefy procedural le\"el. In' Blyth- vs Blyth, for example, L.J. 
Williams, ·while referring to the, retroactivity of a procedural provi­
sion, said: 'To say that this involves t:he section being given re­
trospective, effect is, I think, perhaps misleading. The true view 
is that the section looks forward to the conduct- of trials that take 
place after the coming into force of this Act.' The superficiality of· 
this argument is all too obvious.Nevertheless the English position 
has been invoked in Baldacchino vs Caruana Demajo, where the 
Court .inferred the principle that laws relating to public order are 
not by nature retrospective from the fact established by English 
judges that only procedural laws are innately retrospective. Even 
mor e perplexing is the approach adopted in Police vs Camilleri 
( 1964), where it was decided that the action impugning the validity 
of the Proclamation had been correctly referred to the Civil Court, 
First Hall, under the provisions of the 1961 Constitution. 1 
The problem which emerges from Police vs Camilleri is whether 
Section I2(1)(e) can, if subjected to the same interpretation, have 
the effect of abrogating the principle of retroactivity of procedural 
laws, when procedural changes are effected by repealing Act. The 
truth is that Section 12(1Xe) is really dealing with laws abrogating 
rights of action, not laws effecting procedural changes. Indeed, 
having regard to the strictly narrow meaning attributed to 'repeal' 
by the 1975 law, it can be concluded that a repealing Act which 
effects procedural changes would qualify as an amending Act 
1The logic adopted by the Court was that section 38(2Xe) of the U.K. 
Interpretation Act of 1889, which co"esponds to Section 141)( e) of our 
1975 law, gave ultrattivita to the 1961 Constitution even in procedural 
matters. 
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under the said law. This interpretation results from Section 12(3), 
which provides that amendment includes also 'where an Act or 
provision thereof is repealed and a di/ ferent provision made in the 
place thereof. In line with this reasoning, changes of procedure 
would fall under Section 12(2),. which provides that 'the Act or 
prov1s1on amended as well as anything done thereunder or by 
virtue thereof shall, unless the contrary intention appears, con­
tinue to have full effect, and shall so continue to have effect as 
amended, and subject to the changes made by the Amending Act.' 
Does this sub-section throw any new light on the position of pro­
cedural laws in the gius transitorium, and more especially on the 
jud icial standing of pending proceedings vis-a-vis a new proce­
dural law? An objective answer is reached if we first examine the 
present conflicting theories on the subject, them selves reflected 
on the equally confl
i
cting cases: Butt igieg vs Gatt and Chetcuti 
vs Micallef. 
In Buttigieg vs Gatt, a case of leas e, the defendant raised the 
plea of incompetence on the grounds that, after the submission of 
the writ of summons, a new law was enacted which removed juris­
diction from the Ordinary Courts to the Rent Board. The Court 
accepted the plea because it held that the principle that proce­
dural laws should not affect pending proceedings does not apply, 
if the legislator shows a contrary intention. In support of this 
argument, it said: 'Inkwantu ghall-proc:eduri avvjati ••• il-ligi 
1-gdida ma tiscax tkun recroattiva, imhabba fil-princ:ipju ben kon­
oxxut ubi judicium acceptum, ibi et fin em accipere debet, u mhab­
ba fil�princ:ipju komuni fondamentali u generali 1-iehor in ·subiecta
materia Ii 1-attijiet maghmula u mmexxija ma jistghux minn ligi
gdida jigu kunsidrati bhala mhux maghmula sabiex i kunu mibdulin
jew sostitwiti minn attijiet godda.' On the other hand, in Chetcuti
vs Micallef, the Court, following Gabba, accepted the plea of in­
competence on the grounds that pending proceedings are to be af­
fected by a new procedural law as much as proceedings not yet
initiated. Accordingly, it referred the case to the Land Arbitration
Board. H these two cases are viewed in the light of the 1975 law,
we find that the doctrinal problem is still intact: the question
whether a case still pending is juridically complete still depends
on the Courts' discretion, thus leaving it open to them to accept
or reject the plea of incompetence.
As is too readily appreciated, this state of law is outright un­
desirable. In Italy, all doctrinal confusion has been abolished by 
Section 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides: 'la 
giurisdizione e la competenza si determinano con riguardo allo 
23 
stato di fatto esistente al momento dell a proposizione dell a do­
manda e non hanno rilevanza rispetto ad esse, i successi vi muta­
m en ti dello stato m edesimo.' Indeed, Italian law, unlike Maltese 
law, has managed to emancipate itself from Gabba' s influence, by 
way of a general provision, implying the principle that pending 
proceedings ought not to be affected by procedural laws newly 
enacted. Our law is in desperate need of such a provision, and 
until this position is reached the entire subject is to be regulated 
on the basis of continental doctrine. 
The persisting influence of Gabba upon Maltese Courts is ref­
lected in their obstinate willingness to treat the retroacti vity of 
procedural laws as fanning part of a general theory of public 
order. The two cases quoted above, conflicting as they are, con­
cur in the view that changes in procedure are effected in the pub­
lic interest, and are therefore retrospective. A more flexible ap­
proach is admittedly shown in criminal proceedings. In Police vs 
Borg, for example, the Court had to determine whether section 19 
of the Housing Act - which dealt with the right to appoint a rep­
resentative to physically incapable persons who failed to deliver 
the keys to the Housing Commissioner - was retroactive or not .. 
The decision arrived at was that the right of representing the 
accused was not purely a procedural norm; it had certain substan­
tive implications, because in Maltese law no judgment can be 
delivered in absentia by the Criminal Courts, and it is only upon 
request of the defence counsel that the right of representation can 
be exercised. The criteria adopted were neatly expressed in the 
following words: 1 11-principju illi d-dispozizzjonijiet ta' procedura 
japplikaw retroattivament ma hux daqshekk generiku u assolut, 
f'materja penali ... lmma ghandhom din l-applik azzjoni retroattiva 
dawk il-ligijiet penali ta' procedura Ii huma ·strettament procedu­
rali hiss, u mhux ukoll dawk Ii huma intimament konnessi mal­
merti tal-k awza. Dawn ta' l-ahhar ma ghandhomx dan l-eff ett re�ro-
attiv.' 
In Police vs Borg, the Court dismissed the English law idea 
that procedural laws are innately retroactive, including those ap­
plicable to criminal actions. It endorsed the severe, critical com­
ments made by Cheveau et Helie, Zuppetta and other writers, who 
find the English position not only unreasonable, but also unjust if 
applied without restrictions in the criminal law field. The Maltese 
situation, of course, is slightly better than the English one, but it 
is still in need of change. The desirable legal course to take 
would be to enunciate by way of a general provi'sion that a new 
procedural. law will not affect pending proceedings, and further to 
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guarantee in a criminal. action the right of the accused to continue 
the proceedings in conformity with the new law, if this lies in his 
favour. Accordingly, the 'penale retroattiva', which will soon be 
dealt with, would become applicable also to a procedural penal 
law if the defence so requests .. 
Constitutional law is precisely that branch of law which pre­
sents the greatest paradox. This results from its innate quality of 
being the only part of public law which, paradoxically, protects 
the individual against the possible abuses of State authority. The 
general outcome is the trend of constitutional law to favour in­
di vi dual rights at the expense of the State. Here, in fact, we find 
that a new constitutional norm does not tend to impair vested 
rights, but to perfect them, or even create them, brand-new. Gabba 
seems to maintain that when a law does not impinge upon vested 
rights, it should receive immediate application: a principle which 
some writers have raised to the status of a general theory that all 
laws favourable to the individual should be retroactive. This
view, however, has been discounted by our Courts in Police vs 
Camilleri (1964), where it was held that 1Il-kostituzzjonijiet huma 
soggetti ghall-istess regoli ta' nterpretazzjoni bhal-ligijiet ohra, 
u wahda mill-aqwa fost dawn hi dik tan-nonretroatti vita.' Moreover, 
the maxim omnis nova costitutio futuris form am imponue debet non 
praeterem, was held to mean that 'il-ligi l-gdida m'ghandhiex tfix­
kel drittijiet akkweziti jew vested rights, ·specjalment meta si 
tratta ta' human rights.'. The final decision, therefore, was that 
the points of substantive law involved in the case - viz. the 
rights of freedom of expression and association - would be reg­
ulated by the 1961 Constitution, under which the causes of the 
original criminal action had arisen. It was of no consequence that 
the action impugning the validity of the 1964 Proclamation was 
instituted after the 1964 Constitution had come into force. In sup­
port of the principle that the constitutional norm was just like the 
ordinary legal norm creative of a vested right, the presiding Judge 
made reference to a case decided by the Indian Supreme Court, 
which concerned the question whether the Indian Constitution 
(which for the first time incorporated human rights provisions) 
could be applied retrospectively. :Since the person accused was 
fonnerly devoid of constitutional protection, retroactivity would 
have the effect of acquitting him of political offences charged 
against him. The said Court, however, refused to apply the theory 
of retroactivity of favourable laws, and allowed the prosecution to 
maintain the action. The same position prevails in Italy. In Jan­




tive law which had been in force prior to the commencement of the 
Republican Constitution, and, which although originally valid, 
eventually became incompatible with the provisions of the said 
Constitution, on their coming into force. After holding that such 
incompatibility grounded invalidity, the presiding Judges reached 
the conclusion that the effect would be to invalidate all acts per­
formed under that law after the commencement of the new Constitu­
tion. Therefore, anything done under that same law before the 
Constitution came into force retained its full legal force. In Malta, 
even before Police vs Camilleri, the theory of favourable laws had 
been effectively rejected by our Courts in Caruana Curran vs 
Camilleri, where it was held that a law exempting from import duty 
certain specified objects, including that imported by plaintiff, was 
not retroactive in the absence of a special ·transitory provision to 
that effect. Accordingly, the plaintiff was condemned to pay, 
because he had already imported his laminated silver foil when 
the regulations came into force. The over-all situation is that the 
principle of non-retroactivity works in all directions: it gives rise 
to the doctrine of vested rights and vested Ii abilities, and as 
such, can protect as well as prejudice individual rights. This in 
fact, is the line taken by the 1975 Interpretation Act, which in 
section 12 provides that a repealing Act shall not efface any 
liability incurred under the repealed Act, and shall not affect 
any investigation or proceedings in respect of facts arising under 
the repealed Act, even if such facts warrant the infliction of some 
form of penalty or punishment. 
In the constitutional law sphere, what is of paramount impor­
tance is the process whereby an ordinary legal. norm can, owing to 
its retroactive operation, find itself in conflict with some consti­
tutional. precept. This has been emphatically pointed out by the 
Italian Constitutional Court in a 1957 case, where, after asserting 
that retroactivity is constitutionally prohibited only in the criminal 
law sphere, it clarified the fact that 'con cio, non si vuole esclu­
dere che in singole materie, anche fuori di quella penale, l'eman­
azione di una legge retroattiva possa rivelarsi in contrasto con 
qualche specifico precetto costituzionale.' Therefore, outside the 
criminal law sphere, although retro activity does not automatically 
imply constitutional invalidity, a l�w can be declared invalid on 
the grounds that its retroactive operation runs counter to some 
principle sanctioned by the Constitution. This is precisely what 
happened in 1966, when the Italian Constitutional Court declared 
invalid a law which retroactively imposed taxation upon persons 
who had alienated building sites within a specified legal period. 
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The reason put forward by the Court was that 'such retroactivity 
violated section 53 of the Constirution (which provides that every­
one is to contribute to public expenditure in proportion to his re­
sources), because it failed to take into consideration whether the 
financial or economic gain derived from the alienation still re­
mained within the patrimony of the transferor. Accordingly, it was 
held that a retroactive fiscal law can become invalid, if 'con l'as­
sumere a presupposto della prestazione un fatto o una situazione 
passati, o con l'innovare, estendo i suoi effetti al passato, gli 
effetti dai quali la prestazione trae i suoi caratteri essenziali, 
abbia spezzato il rapporto che deve sussistere tra imposizione e 
capacita contri butoria, ed abbia co si viol ato il precetto costitu­
zionale.' 
In Criminal law, the doctrine of non-retroactivity is neatly ex­
pressed in the maxim nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine 
lege. The strong political ingredient which animates the maxim is 
responsible for the special features which characterize the prin­
ciple of non-retroactivity of the criminal law. As the Italian writer 
Antolisci Francesco points out, 'La massima e il palladio delle 
liberta politiche': it ensures that no per son will be penalized for 
an act which does not constitute a crime at the moment of its com­
mission. This absolute predicability on the part of the accused, 
th at he cannot be convicted for such an act, has been sanctioned 
by the constitutions of most democratic countries. The Italian 
Constitution, in section 25(2), pro vi des: 'N essuno puo e ssere 
punito per un fatto che non sia espressamente preveduto come 
reato dalla legge, n e con p ene che non siano da essa stabilite.' 
The same principle is applied by section 40(8) of the Maltese 
Constitution. In the U.K., the dbctrine of non-retroactivity of the 
criminal law cannot operate on the con sti. tutional law level; it is 
nevertheless applied by English Courts on basis of the 1889 Inter­
pretation Act. In the case R. vs Reah (1968), for example, the 
Court of Appeal had to determine whether section 4(7) of the Cri­
minal Justice Act, which dealt with the offence of receiving stolen 
property, was retroactive in effect. Its final decision was that 
since the said section was not procedural, it was not retroactive 
and could not apply to the defendant because its provisions came 
into force after he had committed the alleged offence. The appeal 
was allowed, and the defendant acquitted. By contrast, those 
States which do not recognise the need for such protection, e.g. 
Algeria, are thereby upholding their sovereign power of criminal­
izing such past acts as they might deem appropriate, thus impin­
ging upon the human right to liberty, and even the right to life, 
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whenever the death penalty is. contemplated. 
The Latin maxim guarantees not merely predictability of non­
conviction on the part of the accused, but also predictability of 
non-subjection to a higher penalty. Therefore, if the penalty for a 
particular offence is increased by a law enacted after its commis-
sion, such law cannot be applied retroactively by the Courts. 
This, in fact, represents the minimum content of the null a poena 
limb of the maxim. By way of an equitable concession, the range 
of this principle has been enlarged, with the result of introducing 
an element of paradox. Many Criminal Codes, including the Mal­
tese Code in ·section 28, have accepted the theory that when a new 
law, enacted in the interval between the moment of commission of 
the offence and the delivery ofsentence, mitigates the penalty in 
respect of that offence, it should be applied in preference to the 
old law. This is the what Gabba calls «penale retroattiva', i.e. the 
process whereby a criminal law nonn created bef
o
re delivery of 
sentence must receive retroactive application, if it favours the 
accused. Some writers have attempted to provide a juridical basis 
to this equitable principle and affirmed that what is really in­
volved here is not really retro activity but the notion of non-ultrat­
tivita i.e. the notion whereby a criminal law norm cannot continue 
to operate, after its repeal or amendment, if it is more severe th an 
the repealing or amending no.an. This idea has been accepted by 
our Courts in Police vs Camilleri, where they referred to the «non­
ultrattivita dell a legge precedente', and rejected in Police vs 
Bugeja, where they described how, by way of exception, section 
28 gives «efficacia retroattivita alla legge posteriore.' 
The re adiness with which our Courts have so far applied the 
'penale retroattiva' is illustrated by Police vs Mifsud and Police 
vs Bugeja. In the first case, it was decided that section 28 con­
templates not merely a new law which diminishes criminal punish­
ment, but also a law which provides that an act no longer consti­
tutes an offence. At this point, however, a doubt immediately 
·arises, in virtue of section 12(1Xe) of the Interpretation Act,
which, as already indicated, provides for the ultrattivita of a re­
pealed law, even if it had imposed a penalty or some other form of 
punishment. In other words, the repeal of such a 1 aw no longer
benefits the defendant in criminal proceedings which are still
pending, nor can it halt future prosecutions in respect of the of­
fences repealed, committed while the repealed Act was still in
force. This provision, of course, has drastically reduced the
sphere of operation of the 'penale retroattiva', and in fact h as
has been denied access into that area where it had most benefited
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the accused. Having regard to its far-reaching effects, therefore, 
it is not surprising that the inte.tpretation of section 28, given in 
the Bugej a case, has now been overruled. Another logical outcome 
of the new restricted concept of 'penale retroattiva' is that the 
'leggi passeggiere di polizia' no longer occupy a special place in 
this equitable doctrine. Prior to 1975, the Coutts had always ack­
na wledged that ultrattivita is NOT proper to the nature of a cri­
minal law norm, the only exception .to this principle being the 
transitory police laws, i.e. those police laws which provide that, 
owing to essentially transitory circumstances, certain acts will 
constitute an offence, or that certain acts will be deemed offences 
for a specified period of time. Accordingly, under the old law, 
these were the ONLY penal laws which survived their own repeal. 
In Police vs Bugeja, for example, it was held that although an 
emergency law was essentially transitory in its character, it did 
not qualify as a transitory police law, and therefore, the principle 
of ultrattivita could not be applied irr its regard, in the absence of 
a specific provision to that effect in the repealing law. Similarly, 
in Police vs Camilleri, which involved the offence of selling meat 
at a price higher than that fixed by the Government, the Coun held 
that a 'legge penale temporanea', in spite of its temporary charac­
ter, was not subject to ultrattivita, and as such its repeal extin­
guished all possibility of continuation of present proceedings as 
well as of initiation of future prosecutions. _Under the 1975 law, 
all these safety-valves are inefficient. Indeed, the principle of 
ultrattivita, in all cases where an offence is altogether repealed, 
is now absolute. Its application does not even require the condi­
tion that the criminal law nonn concerned be of a 'temporary' or 
transitory nature. In this respect, it goes against section 2 of the 
Italian Criminal Code, which provides that the 'penale retroattiva' 
is inapplicable ONLY to 'leggi ecce zionali e temporanee'. 
The doctrine of non-retroactivity of the criminal law, under our 
law, therefore, is three-dimensional: 
(i) It imposes, under pain of constitutional invalidity, that a
law increasing criminal punishment or creating a criminal offence 
cannot be retroactive. 
(ii) Secondly, the 'penale retroattiva' operates in vinue of
section 28 of the Criminal Code within the limits prescribed by 
the Interpretation Act analysed above. This, however, does not 
operate on the constitutional level, and the legislator is free to 
enact that a law mitigating criminal punishment will not apply 
to offences committed under the amended law. 
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(iii) The principle of ultrattivita is implied in all cases where
an offence - whether transitory or not - has been repealed. The 
legislator however is still free to enact that the repealing Act 
will halt all future prosecutions. 
The concept of retroactivity is inseparable from that of time. It 
seeks to make as smooth as possible the periods of transition that 
underly the courses of social progress. It aims at creating a new 
future, without unravelling the facts of the past. Change remains 
forever its main slogan: a peaceful change th at tends to respect 
the individual and his vested rights, in accordance with equity and 
justice .. 
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